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Abstract
This paper studies market competition when rms can inuence consumers
ability to compare market alternatives, through their choice of price formats.
We introduce random graphs as a tool for modelling limited comparability of
formats. Our main results concern the interaction between rms equilibrium
price and format decisions and its implications for industry prots and consumer
switching rates. We show that narrow regulatory interventions that aim to facil-
itate comparisons may have adverse consequences for consumer welfare. Finally,
we argue that our limited-comparability approach provides a new perspective
into the phenomenon of product di¤erentiation.
1 Introduction
Standard models of market competition assume that consumers are able to form a
ranking (which may reect informational constraints) of all the alternatives they are
aware of. In reality, consumers do not always carry out all the comparisons that
shouldbe made. Moreover, whether consumers are able to make comparisons often
depends on how alternatives are described, or framed:
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 Prices and quantities may be dened for di¤erent units of measurement that
consumers often nd di¢ cult to convert to a common standard. For example,
the repayment structure of a loan can be dened in terms of various time units.
Interest on a bank deposit can be presented in various forms. And nutritional
contents of a food product can be specied for various units of weight or volume.
 Price schedules in several industries condition on a large number of diverse con-
tingencies. For instance, a fee structure for banking services species di¤erent
fees for di¤erent classes of transactions. Similarly, a calling plan conditions rates
on the destination, according to some classication of all possible destinations.
Di¤erent rms often utilize di¤erent, partly overlapping classications in the
presentation of their price schedules, and this complicates the task of comparing
them.1
Marketers and regulators alike have long recognized the importance of limited com-
parability as an obstacle to market competition. Nutritional information on food prod-
uct labels is required to conform to rigid formats which include standardized units of
measurement.2 As to regulation of retail nancial services, the following quotes from
recent consumer protection reports are representative:
The possibility to switch providers is essential for consumers to obtain
the best deal. However, the Consumer Market Scoreboard 2009 showed
that only 9% of consumers had switched current bank account during the
previous two years. The causes again relate among others to di¢ culties to
compare o¤ers on banking services...(EC (2009), p. 4)
In order to achieve the aims of comparable and comprehensible product
information, the Commission approach has been, for some products and ser-
vices...to promote the standardization of pre-contractual information oblig-
ations within carefully designed and tested formats...(EC (2009), p. 10)
When deciding whether to switch to another bank, consumers need clear
readily available information that they can understand, as well as the nan-
cial capability and desire to evaluate it. Ease of comparison will be a¤ected
1Of course, di¤erent classications partly reect di¤erences in the cost structure and distribution of
consumer preferences that the rms face. However, they have the additional consequence of hindering
comparisons, and this may be among the reasons rms adopt them in the rst place.
2See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nutrition_facts_label.
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by the structure of current account pricing. The ease with which consumers
are able to compare current accounts is likely to a¤ect their desire to do so
and thus feed through to the competitive pressures that banks face.(OFT
(2008), p. 89)
This paper develops a model of market competition under limited comparability.
In our model, rms choose both how to price their product and how to frame pricing,
so that consumersease of comparisonis a function of the rmsframing decisions.
Our analysis is motivated by the following questions: What are the implications of lim-
ited comparability for the competitiveness of the market outcome? How do regulatory
interventions aimed at enhancing comparability perform when rms respond strategi-
cally to these interventions? What is the relationship between the rmspricing and
framing decisions? How does limited comparability a¤ect the consumers propensity
to switch products?
In our model, two prot-maximizing rms facing a single consumer produce perfect
substitutes at zero cost. They play a simultaneous-move game in which each rm i
chooses a price pi and a pricing structure xi for its product, referred to as a format.
A price is the actual payment that the consumer makes to the rm, whereas a format
is the way in which the price is presented to the consumer. The consumer has a unit
demand and a reservation value that is identical for both rms, regardless of their
format decisions.
Given the rmsprice and format decisions, the consumer chooses as follows. He is
initially assigned to one rm at random, say rm 1. We interpret the consumers initial
rm assignment as a default option arising from previous consumption decisions. With
probability  (x1; x2), the consumer makes a price comparison and chooses the rival
rms product if strictly cheaper. Otherwise, he buys from the rm 1. When (x; y) =
1 for all formats x; y, comparability is perfect and the model collapses to textbook
Bertrand competition. When  (x; y) =  (y; x) for all formats x; y - a property we dub
order independence- price comparisons are independent of the order in which the
consumer considers alternatives.
The consumers decision procedure exhibits prudence, or inertia. Whenever he
is unable to compare his default option to a new alternative, he chooses the former.
Consequently, when the consumer is initially assigned to rm i, he selects it with
probability one when pj  pi and with probability 1 (xi; xj) when pj < pi. This bias
in favor of the default is consistent with the notion that, when consumers face complex
decision problems, they are likely to fall back on a default option, if they have one.
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This behavioral trait has received experimental support (see, for example, Iyengar and
Lepper (2000) and Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004)) and appears to be highly
realistic in market contexts. In industries such as communication, electricity or retail
banking, consumers tend not to switch away from their current (default) provider when
comparison is di¢ cult. Indeed, the above-cited consumer protection reports emphasize
consumer inertia driven by limited comparability as a major cause of low switching
rates and weak competitive forces in these industries.
We represent the comparability structure  as a random graph, where the set of
nodes corresponds to the set of formats, and  (x; y) is the probability of a directed
link from node x to node y. A link from format x to format y means that y is easy
to compare to x. The graph representation entails no loss of generality: its role is to
visualize comparability structures that involve many formats, suggest fruitful notions
of comparability and simplify the exposition of results. By allowing the graph to be
probabilistic, we capture heterogeneity among consumers, in that (x; y) can be viewed
as the rms(common) belief over the consumers ability to compare y to x.
1.1 An Illustrative Example: The StarGraph
We use a simple example to illustrate the model and some of our main insights. Con-
sider a product that can be priced inm+1 di¤erent currencies, one major andm minor
ones. The consumer is able to compare prices denominated in di¤erent currencies only
if he knows the exchange rate. Let q be the probability that the consumer knows
the exchange rate between the major currency and any minor one (whether there is
correlation between minor currencies is immaterial). For simplicity, lets assume that
the consumer does not know the exchange rates between the minor currencies. The
resulting comparability structure can be represented as a stargraph, such as the one
given by Figure 1:
q
q
q
q
(Figure 1)
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A star graph has one corenode, representing prices denominated in the major
currency, and m peripheralnodes (m = 4 in Figure 1) representing prices denom-
inated in a minor currency. Every node is linked to itself with probability one. In
addition, the core node is linked to each of the peripheral nodes with probability
q 2 (0; 1).3
The star graph admits no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On one hand, a perfectly
competitive outcome with zero prots is inconsistent with equilibrium because when a
rm charges a price p > 0 and randomizes over all peripheral formats, it ensures that,
with positive probability, the consumer will fail to make a price comparison. On the
other hand, a non-competitive outcome is inconsistent with pure-strategy equilibrium
by a simple undercutting argument. Since every format is perfectly comparable to
itself, a rm can always mimic its opponents format and slightly undercut its price.
Thus, equilibrium strategies are necessarily mixtures over price-format pairs, reecting
a dispersion of prices and formats in the market. The question is how these two
components are related.
Symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique. Its structure turns out to
depend on the expected number of minor currencies the consumer knows how to convert
into the major currency (and vice versa). When mq > 1, the rmsprice and format
decisions are perfectly correlated. Specically, there exists a cuto¤ price pm, such that
rms adopt the core format with probability one conditional on charging a price below
pm, and rms randomize uniformly over all peripheral formats conditional on charging
a price above pm. In contrast, when mq  1, the rmspricing decisions are identical
across formats. In particular, the equilibrium marginal (mixed) format strategy  has
the property that when one rm plays , its rival is indi¤erent among all formats
because they all induce the same probability of a price comparison.
The threshold q = 1
m
is of interest. When mq > 1, the core format dominates
peripheral formats in terms of comparability, in that adopting it leads to a higher
comparison probability regardless of the rival rms format decision. In contrast, when
mq < 1, each format can induce a higher probability of a price comparison, depending
on the rival rms format strategy. The equilibrium format strategy  is precisely
the distribution that equalizes the probability of price comparison across formats, thus
neutralizing the relevance of format decisions for comparability.
3In this paper, diagrams that represent order-independent graphs are drawn as non-directed graphs
and not as directed graphs with symmetric link probabilities. The di¤erence is that in the latter, the
link between x and y is realized independently of the link between y and x, whereas in the former
they are realized simultaneously. The two are payo¤-equivalent for rms. In addition, throughout the
paper, diagrams suppress self-links.
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The equilibria in the two parameter regions are also fundamentally di¤erent in
terms of industry prots. When gauging the competitiveness of a market outcome, our
benchmark is max-min prots: each rm earns the minimal prot enabled by the con-
sumersbounded rationality as dened by the comparability structure. When mq > 1,
rms earn equilibrium prots above the max-min level. When rm 1 charges the high-
est price in the equilibrium distribution (equal to the consumers reservation value), it
adopts a peripheral format because it minimizes comparability. For rm 2 to act as
competitively as possible (so as to push rm 1s payo¤ to the max-min level), it should
adopt the core format because it maximizes comparability. In equilibrium, however,
whenever rm 2 charges a price above pm, it adopts the less comparable, peripheral
formats, thus lowering the overall probability of price comparison and giving rm 1 ad-
ditional market power which yields prots in excess of the max-min level. In contrast,
when mq  1, equilibrium prots achieve the max-min level by a straightforward ap-
plication of the Minimax Theorem. In particular, the fact that the equilibrium format
strategy  induces a comparison probability that is independent of the opponents
format choice implies that  both max-minimizes and min-maximizes the probability
of a price comparison. As a result, when a rm charges the reservation value (the
highest price in the equilibrium distribution), it earns max-min prots.
What are the theoretical implications of this equilibrium analysis for market regula-
tion? Current regulatory practice seeks to harmonize product description and minimize
the number of formats. Indeed, in the case of the star graph, industry prots and ex-
pected prices increase withm and decrease with q. This is consistent with the intuition
that simplifying comparison is benecial for consumer welfare. However, as we shall
see later, in environments that are only slightly more complex than the star graph, this
intuition can be misleading, and regulatory interventions that enhance comparability
can make the market outcome less competitive, once the rmsequilibrium response to
the intervention is taken into account. In addition, we will show that there is a subtle,
non-trivial connection between comparability and the amount of consumer switching
that occurs in equilibrium.
1.2 Overview of the Main Results
After presenting the model in Section 2, we analyze Nash equilibria for general order-
independent graphs in Section 3. The analysis highlights a novel graph-theoretic prop-
erty, called weighted regularity, which extends the familiar notion of regular graphs,
and turns out to be the appropriate way to generalize the distinction between the
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mq > 1 and mq  1 regions made in the context of the star graph. A graph is
weighted-regular if nodes can be assigned weights, such that each node has the same
total weighted expected number of links. Under weighted regularity, all formats are
equally comparable, once the frequency with which they are used is factored in.
We show that if a graph is weighted-regular, there exists a symmetric Nash equi-
librium in which the rmsprice and format strategies are statistically independent,
and their payo¤s are equal to the max-min level. Conversely, if rmsprice and for-
mat strategies are statistically independent in some Nash equilibrium, the graph must
be weighted-regular and rms necessarily earn max-min payo¤s in this equilibrium.
Moreover, their marginal pricing strategies must be identical. Thus, correlation be-
tween price and format decisions is a necessary (observable) manifestation of collusive
equilibrium prots.
In Section 4, we turn to a class of order-independent graphs, referred to as bi-
symmetric, which generalize the star graph. In bi-symmetric graphs, the set of for-
mats is partitioned into two categories, such that the probability of a link between two
formats depends only on their categories. We provide a complete characterization of
the (unique) symmetric Nash equilibrium for bi-symmetric graphs. We use this char-
acterization to demonstrate that regulatory interventions that enhance comparability
may have subtle and unexpected implications for equilibrium prots and consumer
switching.
In Section 5, we relax order independence and examine the extent to which our
equilibrium characterization for order-independent graphs can be extended. Section 6
is devoted to a discussion of the relation between our model and the more conventional
view of product di¤erentiation based on preference heterogeneity.
1.3 Related Literature
Our paper joins recent attempts to formalize in broad terms the various ways in which
choice behavior is sensitive to the framing of alternatives. Rubinstein and Salant
(2008) study choice behavior, where the notion of a choice problem is extended to
include both the choice set and a frame, interpreted as observable information which
should not a¤ect the rational assessment of alternatives but nonetheless a¤ects choice.
A choice function assigns an element in the choice set to every frame-augmented
choice problem. Rubinstein and Salant conduct a choice-theoretic analysis of such ex-
tended choice functions, and identify conditions under which extended choice functions
are consistent with utility maximization. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) use a similar
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framework to extend standard welfare analysis to situations in which choices are sen-
sitive to frames. Our notion of frame dependencedi¤ers from the one in the above
models. First, we associate frames (i.e., formats) with individual alternatives, rather
than entire choice sets. Second, in our model framing creates preference incomplete-
ness but never leads to preference reversal. Finally, our focus is on market implications
rather than choice-theoretic analysis.
This paper is closely related to Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), which rst formalized
the idea that framing (and marketing in general) a¤ects preference incompleteness by
inuencing the set of alternatives that consumers subject to their preference ranking.
There are two major di¤erences. First, Eliaz and Spiegler (2007) assume that the
consumers propensity to consider a new market alternative is a function of its frame
and the defaults payo¤-relevant details. Second, in the market applications analyzed
in Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), framing decisions are costly and price setting is assumed
away. The resulting market model is substantially di¤erent from ours, emphasizing
the rmstrade-o¤ between increasing their market share and economizing on their
xed marketing costs. Chioveanu and Zhou (2009) analyze a many-rms variant on
our model in which the comparability structure is a reduced form of the star graph
and consumers lack default options. They show that the market equilibrium need not
converge to the competitive outcome as the number of rms tends to innity.
More generally, our paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on the
market interaction between prot-maximizing rms and boundedly rational consumers.
Rubinstein (1993) analyzes monopolistic behavior when consumers di¤er in their abil-
ity to understand complex pricing schedules. Piccione and Rubinstein (2003) study
intertemporal pricing when consumers have diverse ability to perceive temporal pat-
terns. Spiegler (2006a,b) analyzes markets in which prot-maximizing rms compete
over consumers who rely on naive sampling to evaluate each rm. Gabaix and Laib-
son (2006) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) study interaction with consumers having
limited awareness of future contingencies. Spiegler (2006b) and Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) are specically preoccupied with ways rms strategically use confusingpricing
schemes to increase consumersdecision errors. Other papers (Carlin (2008), Ellison
and Wolitzky (2008) and Wilson (2008)) model obfuscation as a deliberate attempt to
increase rational consumerssearch costs.
Finally, our paper can be viewed as an extension of a well-known model due to
Varian (1980), in which consumers are divided into two groups: those who make perfect
price comparisons, and those who are loyalto the rm they are initially assigned to
and thus make no comparison with other market alternatives. In equilibrium, rms
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play a mixed pricing strategy. In Varians model, the fraction of loyalconsumers is
exogenous, whereas in our model it is a function of the formats that rms adopt for
their products. An interesting aspect of our analysis is the characterization of cases
(captured by the notion of weighted regularity) in which format decisions become
irrelevant in equilibrium, such that our model e¤ectively collapses into Varians.
2 The Model
A graph is a pair (X; ), where X is a nite set of nodes and  : X X ! [0; 1] is a
function that determines the probability (x; y) with which a directed edge links node
x to node y. Let n denote jXj. We refer to nodes as formats, as they represents various
ways in which rms can frame the pricing of an intrinsically homogeneous product. A
graph  is deterministic if for every distinct x; y 2 X, (x; y) 2 f0; 1g. A graph  is
order independent if (x; y) = (y; x) for all x; y 2 X. Assume that (x; x) = 1 for
every x 2 X - that is, every format is linked to itself.4
Consider a market consisting of two identical, expected-prot maximizing rms and
one consumer. The rms produce a homogenous product at zero cost. The consumer
is interested in buying one unit of the product. His willingness to pay for the product
is 1, independently of the rmsformat decisions. The rms play a simultaneous-move
game with complete information. A pure strategy for rm i is a pair (pi; xi), where
pi 2 [0; 1] is a price and xi 2 X is a format. We allow rm i to employ mixed strategies
of the form
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

, where i 2 (X) and F xi is a cdf over [0; 1] conditional
on x 2 Supp(i). We refer to i as rm is format strategy and to F xi as rm is
pricing strategy at x. The marginal pricing strategy induced by a mixed strategy 
; (F x)x2Supp()

is
F =
X
x2Supp()
(x)F x
Given a cdf F on [0; 1], let F  denote its left limit. For any subset non-empty Z  X,
U(Z) denotes the uniform distribution over Z.
Given a realization (pi; xi)i=1;2 of the rmsstrategies, the consumer chooses a rm
according to the following rule. He is randomly assigned to a rm - with probability
1
2
for each rm. Suppose that he is assigned to rm i. If there is a direct link from xi
to xj - an event that occurs with probability (xi; xj) - the consumer makes a price
4This assumption is made for expositional simplicity. All our results continue to hold (subject to
minor modications in the case of Section 4) if we assume instead that (x; x) > 0 for all x 2 X.
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comparison and chooses rm j if pj < pi. In all other cases, the consumer chooses the
initially assigned rm i.
To illustrate the rmspayo¤ function, consider the graph given by Figure 2. Let
X = fx; yg,  (x; y) = q and (y; x) = 0. Suppose that rm 1 adopts the format x
while rm 2 adopts the format y. If p1 < p2, rm 1 earns a payo¤ of 12p1 while rm 2
earns 1
2
p2. If p1 > p2, rm 1 earns p1  (12   12q) while rm 2 earns p2  (12 + 12q).
yx q
(Figure 2)
When rm i plays the mixed strategy
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

, we can write rm js
expected payo¤ from the pure strategy (p; x) as follows:
p
2
 f1 +
X
y2X
i(y)  [(1  F yi (p))  (y; x)  F y i (p)  (x; y)]g
Is consumer choice rational?
Fully rational consumers with perfect ability to make comparisons are represented by
a complete graph - i.e. (x; y) = 1 for all x; y 2 X. Rational consumers always make a
price comparison, and in this case the model is reduced to standard Bertrand competi-
tion. For a typically incomplete graph, the consumers choice behavior is inconsistent
with maximizing a random utility function over price-format pairs.
To see why, consider the following deterministic, order-independent graph: X =
fa; b; cg, (x; y) = 1 for all x; y 2 X except for (a; c) = 0. Suppose that p < p0 < p00.
When faced with the strategy prole ((p; a); (p0; b)), the consumer chooses (p; a) with
probability one. Similarly, when faced with the strategy prole ((p0; b); (p00; c)), the
consumer chooses (p0; b) with probability one. However, when faced with the strategy
prole ((p; a); (p00; c)), the consumer chooses each alternative with probability 1
2
. No
random utility function over [0; 1]X can rationalize such choice behavior. The reason
is that the graph represents a binary relation which is intransitive, and this translates
into intransitivity of the implied revealed preference relation over price-format pairs.
In general, our model of consumer choice with deterministic graphs is a special case
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of incomplete preferences over [0; 1]X, where both strict and weak preference relations
may be intransitive, yet the strict preference relation is acyclic. A probabilistic graph
merely represents a distribution over such incomplete preferences.
Hide and seek
Our analysis will make use of an auxiliary two-player, zero-sum game, which is a
generalization of familiar games such as Matching Pennies. The players (not to be
identied with the rms) are referred to as hider and seeker, denoted h and s. The
players share the same action space X. Given the action prole (xh; xs), the hiders
payo¤ is  (xh; xs) and the seekers payo¤ is (xh; xs). We will refer to this game as
the hide-and-seek game associated with (X; ). Given a mixed-strategy prole (h; s)
in this game, the probability that the seeker nds the hider is
v (h; s) =
X
x2X
X
y2X
h (x)s (y) (x; y)
To see the relevance of this auxiliary game to our model, suppose that rm 1s
marginal format and price strategies are  and F , respectively, where the latter is
continuous over the support [pl; pu]. When rm 2 considers charging the price pu, it
should select a format that minimizes the probability of a price comparison. Hence,
it behaves as a hider in the hide-and-seek game, where the seekers strategy is .
Similarly, when rm 2 considers charging the price pl, it should select a format that
maximizes the probability of a price comparison. Hence, it behaves as a seeker in the
hide-and-seek game, where the hiders strategy is . When a rm considers charging
an intermediate price, it reasons partly as a hider and partly as a seeker.
The value of the hide-and-seek game is
v = max
s
min
h
v (h; s)
The max-min payo¤ of a rm in our model is thus 1
2
(1   v). The reason is that the
worst-case scenario for a rm is that its opponent plays p = 0 and adopts the seekers
max-min format strategy, to which a best-reply is to play p = 1 and minimize the
probability of a price comparison.
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Basic properties of Nash equilibria
We will conduct a detailed analysis of Nash equilibria in the following sections. In
this section, we present two preliminary results. The rst characterizes the support
of the marginal pricing strategies when both rms make positive prots. The second
provides a simple necessary and su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium outcome to be
competitive (that is, both rms charge zero prices).
Proposition 1 In any Nash equilibrium in which rms make positive prots, there
exists a price pl 2 (0; 1) such that, for i = 1; 2: (i) the support of Fi is [pl; 1]; (ii) Fi is
strictly increasing on [pl; 1].
Proposition 2 Let Fi be a Nash equilibrium marginal pricing strategy for rm i = 1; 2.
Then, F1 (0) = F2 (0) = 1 if and only if there exists a format x 2 X such that
(x; x) = 1 for every x 2 X.
A corollary of Proposition 1 is that if rm i earns the max-min payo¤ 1
2
(1  v) in
Nash equilibrium, rm js format strategy conditional on p < 1 is a max-min strategy
for the seeker in the associated hide-and-seek game.
The proofs of these results rely on price undercutting arguments that are somewhat
more subtle than familiar ones. For instance, suppose that rm 1s marginal pricing
strategy has a mass point at some price p which belongs to the support of rm 2s
marginal pricing strategy. In conventional models of price competition, there is a clear
incentive for rm 2 to undercut its price slightly below p. In our model, however,
price undercutting may have to be accompanied by a change in the format strategy in
order to be e¤ective. Adopting a new format strategy may be undesirable for rm 2
because it could change the probability of a price comparison when the realization of
rm 1s pricing strategy is p 6= p.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
a competitive equilibrium outcome is violated.
Condition 1 For every x 2 X there exists y 6= x such that (y; x) < 1.
This condition ensures that the rmsmax-min payo¤ is strictly positive - or, equiv-
alently, that the value of the associated hide-and-seek game is strictly below one. Once
competitive equilibrium outcomes have been eliminated, any Nash equilibrium must be
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mixed. To see why, assume that each rm i plays a pure strategy (pi; xi). If 0 < pi  pj,
then rm j can protably deviate to the strategy (pi  "; xi), where " > 0 is arbitrarily
small. If pi = 0, rm i earns zero prots, contradicting the observation that the rms
max-min payo¤s are strictly positive. Thus, from now on, we will take it for granted
that Nash equilibrium is strictly mixed.
Discussion
We conclude this section with a discussion of several features of our model.
First, we assume that a rms choice of format does not restrict the set of prices it
can charge. This simplifying assumption is not without loss of generality. Suppose, for
example, that rms sell a product with attributes A and B, that a format is a price pair
(pA; pB), and that the price paid by the consumer is pA + pB. Then, a rms choice of
format uniquely determines its price. A natural assumption in this case would be that
consumers are able to compare two di¤erent price pairs if and only if one dominates the
other. It can also be veried that there does not exist a set of formats (a partition of
the set of price pairs, for instance) which represents this comparability structure, such
that rms can choose any price for any given format. An interesting generalization of
our model would assume that a set of compatible prices P (x) is associated with every
format x 2 X.
Second, although the default bias inherent in the consumers choice procedure is
backed by experimental evidence and everyday intuition, one could contemplate alter-
native assumptions as to how consumers choose when confronting hard-to-compare
formats. For example, they could randomize between rms, or switch away from
the default with probability one. It should be emphasized that in the case of order-
independent graphs, these alternative assumptions (as well as any rule that does not
discriminate between rms 1 and 2) are equivalent for equilibrium analysis, as they
all induce the same payo¤ function for rms; the distinction between them is rele-
vant only for our discussion of consumer switching. Only when order independence is
relaxed does the distinction matter for rmsequilibrium behavior.
Third, in our model rms cannot use their format decisions to fool consumers into
paying a price above the reservation value, even when they are unable to compare
formats. This is consistent with the default-based interpretation of the consumers
choice procedure. Even when consumers fail to understand the format used by their
current (default) provider, they do know the total amount they are being charged and
whether it exceeds their reservation value. A consumer who receives a monthly bill
for mobile phone services may wonder how the bill was calculated, but can read the
bottom line. Since the consumer in our model switches only if he does make a proper
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price comparison, he will never buy the new product if it is priced above the reservation
value.
Fourth, our model takes the comparability structure as given: the function  rep-
resents an exogenous distribution over an unobservable characteristic of consumers,
namely their ability to compare formats. The  comparability structure could be de-
rived from a larger decision problem, in which the consumer (optimally) chooses in
a prior stage whether to acquire this ability by incurring a cost of thinking. For
example, in the star graphexample of Section 1.1, the reason why the consumer fails
to convert one currency into another could be his choice not to memorize the exchange
rate. However, for many purposes, it makes sense to regard  as exogenous. Even if
the consumers mastery of exchange rates is a consequence of prior optimization, it is
probably obtained taking into account a multitude of market situations, in addition to
the one in question. In other words, it is optimization in a general equilibriumsense,
whereas we focus on a partial equilibriumanalysis.
Finally, our model assumes a rm simultaneously chooses a price and a format. An
alternative modeling strategy would be to assume that rms compete in prices only
after committing to the format. We opt for the former because we believe that in
most situations of interest - particularly in modern online environments - determining
a products price and how to present it are naturally joint decisions; it would be
implausible to allow commitment in formats but not in prices. At any rate, analyzing
the alternative model is straightforward. For simplicity, consider the case of order-
independent graphs. For a given prole (x1; x2) of the rmsrst-stage format decisions,
the price competition second-stage subgame proceeds exactly as in Varian (1980), where
the probability that the consumer makes a comparison is xed at (x1; x2). In the rst
stage, rms make their format decisions as if they play a common-interest game in
which both share the payo¤ function  , such that in equilibrium, each rm i chooses
a format strategy i that minimizes v(; j). For example, whenever the graph has two
formats x and y such that (x; y) = 0, it is an equilibrium for one rm to choose x and
the other to choose y in the rst stage, with both rms playing p = 1 in the second
stage.
3 Nash Equilibrium under Order Independence
In this section, we analyze mixed strategy equilibria for order-independent graphs.
The analysis hinges on a notion of uniform comparabilityacross formats. From a
graph-theoretic point of view, the familiar concept of regular graphs is perhaps the
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most basic notion of uniform comparability. An order-independent graph is regular ifP
y2X  (x; y) = v for all x 2 X. In a regular graph, all formats are equally comparable
in that all formats have the same expected number of links. However, this notion of
uniform comparability ignores the frequency with which di¤erent formats are adopted.
If, for example, x is an isolated node yet both rms adopt it with probability one, the
consumer will make a price comparison with probability one. Hence, a proper notion of
uniform comparability should take into account the frequency of adoption of di¤erent
formats.
Denition 1 An order-independent graph (X; ) is weighted-regular if there exist  2
(X) and v 2 [0; 1] such that Py2X  (y) (x; y) = v for any x 2 X. We say that 
veries weighted regularity.
Regularity thus corresponds to a special case in which the format strategy that
veries weighted regularity is U(X). Note that the set of distributions that verify
weighted regularity is convex. The following are examples of weighted-regular, order-
independent graphs.
Example 3.1: Equivalence relations. Consider a deterministic graph that in which
(x; y) = 1 if and only if x  y, where  is an equivalence relation. Any distribution
that assigns equal probability to each equivalence class veries weighted regularity.
Example 3.2: A cycle with random links. LetX = f1; 2; :::; ng, where n is even. Assume
that for every distinct x; y 2 X, (x; y) = 1
2
if jy   xj = 1 or jy   xj = n   1, and
(x; y) = 0 otherwise. A uniform distribution over all odd-numbered nodes veries
weighted regularity.
Example 3.3: Linear similarity. Consider the following deterministic graph. Let X =
f1; 2; :::; 3Lg, where L  2 is an integer. For every distinct x; y 2 X, (x; y) = 1 if
and only if jx  yj = 1. A uniform distribution over the subset f3k  1gk=1;:::;L veries
weighted regularity.
The star graph of Section 1.1 is weighted regular whenever mq  1. Let xc denote
the core node. The format strategy that veries weighted regularity in this case is ,
dened by the following equation, which holds for every peripheral format x 6= xc:
(xc)  1 + (1  (xc))  q = (xc)  q + (x)  1 + (1  (xc)  (x))  0
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The L.H.S. is the probability of a price comparison of the format xc, while the R.H.S.
is the probability of a price comparison of any peripheral format x 6= xc.
An equivalent denition of weighted regularity makes use of the auxiliary hide-and-
seek game. A graph is weighted-regular if and only if the associated hide-and-seek
game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The distribution  2 (X) veries weighted regularity in a graph (X; ) if
and only if (; ) is a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game.
Proof. Suppose that  veries weighted regularity. If one of the players in the as-
sociated hide-and-seek game plays , every strategy for the opponent - including 
itself - is a best-reply. Now suppose that (; ) is a Nash equilibrium in the associ-
ated hide-and-seek game. Denote v(; ) = v. If some format attains a higher (lower)
probability of a price comparison than v, then  cannot be a best-reply for the seeker
(hider). Therefore, very format generates the same probability of a price comparison -
namely v - against .
An important feature of our model is that it allows rms to condition their pricing
strategy on the format they adopt. It is therefore of interest to know when they choose
not to do so in equilibrium, especially as this turns out to have important welfare
implications. A mixed strategy
 
; (F x)x2Supp()

exhibits price-format independence
if F x = F y for any x; y 2 Supp(). The next proposition establishes a link between
weighted regularity, price-format independence and equilibrium prots. Dene the cdf
G(p) = 1  1  v

2v
 1  p
p
(1)
with support [
1  v
1 + v
; 1].
Proposition 3 Consider a graph (X; ).
(i) Suppose that 1 and 2 verify weighted regularity. Then, there exists a Nash equi-
librium in which rm i, i = 1; 2, plays the format strategy i and the pricing strategy
F xi  G for all x 2 X, and earns max-min payo¤s.
(ii) Let
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

i=1;2
be a Nash equilibrium in which both rms strategies
exhibit price-format independence. Then, 1 and 2 verify weighted regularity, rms
earn max-min payo¤s, and their marginal pricing strategy is given by 1.
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Proof. (i) Suppose that rm i plays the format strategy i. By the denition of
weighted regularity, every format that the rival rm j may adopt attains the same
probability of a price comparison v against i. We can thus assume that the probability
of a price comparison is exogenously xed at v. Construct a cdf F such that every p 2
[
1  v
1 + v
; 1] generates the same expected payo¤. This leads to the following functional
equation:
1  v
2
=
p
2
 [1 + v(1  F (p))  vF (p)]
The unique solution is G. It is straightforward to verify that no rm would want to
deviate to a price p <
1  v
1 + v
.
(ii) By assumption, F xi = Fi for any x 2 Supp(i), i = 1; 2. Therefore, x 2
argmin v(; i) for every x 2 Supp(j) - otherwise, it would be protable to deviate
to the pure strategy (1; y) for some y 2 argmin v(; i). Similarly, x 2 argmax v(; i)
for every x 2 Supp(j) - otherwise, it would be protable to deviate to the pure
strategy (pl; y) for some y 2 argmax v(; i). It follows that (1; 2) and (2; 1)
are Nash equilibria of the associated hide-and-seek game. Hence, as 1 and 2 max-
minimize as well as min-maximize v, (1; 1) and (2; 2) are also Nash equilibria of the
associated hide-and-seek game. By Lemma 1, both 1 and 2 verify weighted regularity.
Relatively standard arguments (see Proposition 1 in Spiegler (2006)) establish that the
equilibrium pricing strategy for each rm must be given by (1) if the probability of a
price comparison is exogenously xed at v.
Formula (1) is precisely the equilibrium strategy in the two-rm case of Varians
model described in Section 1.3 (Varian (1980)). When rms in our model play a format
strategy that veries weighted regularity, they neutralize the relevance of the format
decision because this strategy enforces uniform comparability across formats. There-
fore, the model is e¤ectively reduced to Varians model, which does not incorporate
format decisions. It should be noted that, for weighted regularity alone, it su¢ ces that
the support of the pricing strategies is the same at all formats in the support.
To demonstrate this result, let us revisit some of the examples presented in the
previous sub-section. In Example 3.2, suppose that rm 1 (2) plays a format strategy
which is a uniform distribution over all odd-numbered (even-numbered) nodes. Both
distributions verify weighted regularity. Suppose further that both rms play indepen-
dently the pricing strategy given by (1), where v = 2
n
. This strategy prole constitutes
a Nash equilibrium.
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In Example 3.3, suppose that both rms play a format strategy which mixes uni-
formly over the subset of nodes f3k   1gk=1;:::;L. This distribution veries weighted
regularity. Suppose further that both rms play independently the pricing strategy
given by (1), where v = 1
L
. This strategy prole constitutes a symmetric Nash equi-
librium, in which the consumer makes a price comparison if and only if the rms adopt
the same format. In this equilibrium, the formats played with positive probability are
local monopolies: when the consumer faces two di¤erent formats, he adheres to his
default. Price comparisons occur only when both rms use the same format.
While correlation between prices and formats is necessary for collusiveequilib-
rium prots, it is not su¢ cient. In particular, there exist weighted regular graphs
that admit Nash equilibria in which price and format decisions are correlated, and yet
rms earn max-min payo¤s. This is trivially the case when we take a weighted-regular
graph and replicate one of its nodes, such that the new graph contains two distinct
formats x; x0 with (x; y) = (x0; y) for every y 2 X. In this case, we can construct an
equilibrium in which the format strategy veries weighted regularity (hence rms earn
max-min payo¤s), yet the format x is associated with low prices while the format x0 is
associated with high prices. In Piccione and Spiegler (2009) we provide a non-trivial
example that does not rely on duplicating nodes.
Unlike the link between price-format independence and weighted regularity, we
conjecture that there is a logical equivalence between weighted regularity and max-
min equilibrium payo¤s. However, at present we can only prove partial results that are
consistent with this conjecture. For example, suppose that we impose the restriction
that at least one rm plays an equilibrium format strategy that has full support.
Proposition 4 Consider a Nash equilibrium
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

i=1;2
. If rm 1 earns
max-min payo¤s and 2(x) > 0 for all x 2 X, then (X; ) is weighted-regular.
The proof of this result relies entirely on the associated hide-and-seek game. It
shows that if the seeker in the hide-and-seek game has a max-min strategy with full
support, there must exist a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game.
4 Bi-Symmetric Graphs
In this section, we provide a complete characterization of symmetric Nash equilibria
in a special class of graphs, which extends the star graph of Section 1.1. An order-
independent graph (X; ) is bi-symmetric if X can be partitioned into two sets, Y and
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Z, such that for every distinct x; y 2 X:
(x; y) =
8><>:
qY if x; y 2 Y
qZ if x; y 2 Z
q if x 2 Y , y 2 Z
wheremaxfqY ; qZ ; qg < 1. Let nI denote the number of formats in category I 2 fY; Zg.
In the star graph, nZ = 1, nY = m, qZ = 1 and qY = 0.
Bi-symmetric graphs are attractive because with simple parameter restrictions they
capture various instances of comparability. When q < minfqY ; qZg, we may interpret
formats within each of the two categories Y and Z as relatively similar and therefore
relatively easy to compare, whereas formats from di¤erent categories as more di¢ cult
to compare. In contrast, when qY < q < qZ , we may interpret the formats in category
Z as inherently simpler than those in Y (possibly because they contain translations or
conversion guides that are absent from the formats in Y ).
Dene the average connectivitywithin category I 2 fY; Zg as
qI =
1 + qI  (nI   1)
nI
Without loss of generality, assume qZ  qY .
One can verify (see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix) that a bi-symmetric
graph is weighted-regular if and only if
(qY   q)(qZ   q)  0
The star graph satises qZ = 1 and q

Y =
1
m
, such that this inequality holds if and
only if mq  1. When qY = qZ = q, there is a continuum of format strategies that
verify weighted regularity. Otherwise, the unique format strategy that veries weighted
regularity assigns probability (qY   q)=[(qY   q) + (qZ   q)] to the set Z, and mixes
uniformly within Y and within Z. The value of the hide-and-seek game under weighted
regularity is
v =
8>>><>>>:
q when qY = q

Z = q
qY q

Z   q2
(qY   q) + (qZ   q)
otherwise
(2)
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By Proposition 3, if weighted regularity holds, there is a symmetric equilibrium
in which the rms marginal format strategy veries weighted regularity, while their
(format-independent) pricing strategy is given by (1).
When the condition for weighted regularity is not satised - i.e., when q is strictly
between qY and q

Z - the value of the hide-and-seek game is v
 = q, since there is
a Nash equilibrium in this game in which the seeker (hider) plays U(Z) (U(Y )). It
can be veried that there exists a equilibrium with the following cuto¤ structure.
There exists a price pm 2 (pl; 1), such that the format strategy conditional on any price
p 2 [pl; pm) is L  U(Z), the format strategy conditional on any price p 2 (pm; 1] is
U  U(Y ). The marginal pricing strategy F satises:
F (pm) =
q   qY
qZ   qY
(3)
To compute the rmsequilibrium payo¤, let us write down the payo¤ that a rm
earns when it plays the pure strategy - which belongs to the support of the equilibrium
mixed strategy - consisting of the price p = 1 and some format y 2 Y :
1
2
 [F (pm)  (1  q) + (1  F (pm)  (1  qY )]
Plugging in (3), we obtain the expression:
1
2
 [ q   q

Y
qZ   qY
 (1  q) + q

Z   q
qZ   qY
 (1  qY )] (4)
which strictly exceeds the max-min payo¤ 1
2
(1   q). We omit the full description of
the conditional pricing strategies for the sake of brevity. The following proposition
characterizes the symmetric equilibria of bi-symmetric graphs.
Proposition 5 Let (X; ) be a bi-symmetric graph. In any symmetric Nash equilib-
rium:
(i) If (qY  q)(qZ q)  0, rms play a format strategy that veries weighted regularity.
In particular, if (qY   q)(qZ   q) > 0, the pricing strategy at each x 2 X is given by
(1), where v is given by (2). Firms earn the max-min payo¤ 1
2
(1  v).
(ii) If (qY  q)(qZ q) < 0, rms play the cuto¤ equilibrium characterized by (L; H ; F )
above. Their equilibrium payo¤ is given by (4).
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Thus, when parameter values t situations in which the categorization of formats
captures their relative complexity, the rmsequilibrium strategy displays perfect price-
format correlation and rms earn collusive prots. In contrast, when parameter
values t situations in which the categorization of formats captures their similarity,
the equilibrium strategy displays price-format independence and rms earn max-min
payo¤s.
4.1 Does Greater Comparability ImplyMore Competitive Out-
comes?
Proposition 5 has interesting implications for relationship between industry prots
(equivalently, the expected price paid by the consumer) and comparability. Imagine
a regulator who wishes to impose a product description standard that will enhance
comparability. Suppose that qY < q < q

Z . If the regulators intervention increases
the values of q and qY , the intervention will lower equilibrium prots. If, however, the
intervention causes an increase in the value of qZ (without changing q and q

Y ), the
intervention will raise equilibrium prots.
The intuition is as follows. In the cuto¤ equilibrium, the probability that a rm
charging p = 1 faces a price comparison is a weighted average of q and qY . The para-
meter qZ a¤ects this probability only indirectly, by changing the equilibrium weights.
Specically, a higher qZ gives expensive rms a stronger incentive to adopt the hiding
formats that constitute Y . As a result, the equilibrium cuto¤ price pm changes and
rms are more likely to charge a price above pm (and thus adopt the format strategy
H). Since the intervention leaves q and qY unchanged, and since q > q

Y , the overall
probability that an expensive rm faces a price comparison decreases. Hence, expensive
rms gain greater market power and greater prots.
Thus, local improvements in comparability may have a counter-intuitive, detri-
mental impact on consumer welfare. Finding a general characterization of the class
of transformations of  that lead to unambiguously more competitive outcomes is a
challenging comparative-statics problem. For instance, in weighted-regular graphs,
equilibrium prots unambiguously decrease with . The reason is that the equilib-
rium prots are 1
2
(1  v), where v is the value of the hide-and-seek, which increases
whenever any entry in the seekers payo¤ function is increased.
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4.2 Consumer Switching
The consumer protection reports quoted in the Introduction convey the message that
greater market competitiveness goes hand-in-hand with consumers switching more fre-
quently, and that limited comparability plays a signicant role in this regard. The case
of bi-symmetric graphs illustrates some subtleties in the relationship between compa-
rability and switching.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the probability with which the consumer switches rm
conditional on making a price comparison (a quantity known in the marketing liter-
ature as the conversion rate) is 1
2
. The reason is simple. Conditional on making
a comparison, the consumer faces a symmetric posterior probability distribution over
price proles (p1; p2). Since the marginal equilibrium pricing strategy is continuous,
the probability that the default is the more expensive option is 1
2
.
Since the conversion rate is 1
2
, it follows that the switching rate is half the prob-
ability that consumers make a price comparison. When the bi-symmetric graph is
weighted-regular, the equilibrium strategy displays price-format independence, and the
probability of a price comparison is given by expression (2). Since equilibrium payo¤s
are equal to the max-min level in this range of parameter values, any improvement in
comparability leads to a higher switching rate and lower equilibrium prots.
In contrast, when the bi-symmetric graph is not weighted-regular, the equilibrium
probability of price comparison is
[F (pm)]2qZ + 2F (p
m)(1  F (pm)q + [1  F (pm)]2qY
The co-movement of this expression with the competitiveness of the market outcome is
ambiguous because, as we already showed, equilibrium prots in the relevant parameter
range increase with qY and decrease with q

Z . Thus, when prices and formats are
correlated, the positive link between the switching rate and market competitiveness
breaks down.
5 Order-Dependent Graphs
In this section we explore some properties of Nash equilibria for graphs that violate
order independence. We begin by extending the notion of weighted regularity.
Denition 2 A graph (X; ) is weighted-regular if there exist  2 (X) and v 2 [0; 1]
such that
P
y2X  (y) (x; y) =
P
y2X  (y) (y; x) = v for all x 2 X. We say that 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veries weighted regularity.
The equivalence between weighted regularity and the existence of symmetric equi-
librium in the associated hide-and-seek game, established for order-independent graphs,
needs to be qualied when order independence is relaxed.
Lemma 2 (i) If  veries weighted regularity, then (; ) is a Nash equilibrium in the
hide-and-seek game; (ii) If (; ) is a Nash equilibrium in the hide-and-seek game and
(x) > 0 for every x 2 X, then  veries weighted regularity.
Proof. The proof of part (i) is identical to the order-independent case. Let us turn
to part (ii). Suppose that (; ) is a Nash equilibrium in the hide-and-seek game.
Let x 2 (X) denote a degenerate probability distribution that assigns probability
one to node x. Since  is a best-reply for the hider against , v(x; )  v(; ) for
every x 2 X. By the full-support assumption, if there is a frame x 2 X for which
v(x; ) > v(; ), then
P
x2X (x)v(
x; ) > v(; ). The L.H.S. of this inequality is
by denition v(; ), a contradiction. Similarly, since  is a best-reply for the seeker
against , v(; x)  v(; ) for every x 2 X. By the full-support assumption, if there
is a frame x 2 X for which v(; x) < v(; ), then Px2X (x)v(; x) < v(; ), a
contradiction. It follows that for every x 2 X, v(x; ) = v(; x) = v(; ).
To see how the full support assumption is necessary for the second part of this
lemma, consider the following example. Let X = fa; b; cg, (a; b) = (a; c) = 1 and
(x; y) = 0 for all other distinct x; y. The hide-and-seek game induced by this graph
has a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both the hider and the seeker play b and
c with probability 1
2
each. However, the graph is not weighted-regular.
The full-support qualication carries over to the next result, which is a variation
on Proposition 3. The proof is close as well, and therefore omitted.
Proposition 6 (i) Suppose that 1 and 2 verify weighted regularity. Then, there
exists a Nash equilibrium in which each rm i = 1; 2 plays the format strategy i and
the pricing strategy F xi  G for all x 2 X, and earns max-min payo¤s.
(ii) Let
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

i=1;2
be a Nash equilibrium in which both rms strategies
exhibit price-format independence and the format strategies have full support. Then,
1 and 2 verify weighted regularity, rms earn max-min payo¤s, and their marginal
pricing strategy is given by (1).
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One can extend the notion of bi-symmetric graphs by allowing asymmetric connec-
tivity between the sets Y and Z - that is, (y; z) = qY Z and (z; y) = qZY for every
y 2 Y , z 2 Z, where qY Z 6= qZY (while maintaining the assumption that connectivity is
symmetric and constant within each of the two sets). The reader can easily verify that
such graphs are never weighted regular. It turns out that these graphs can give rise to
patterns of price-format correlation that are di¤erent from those captured by the cuto¤
equilibria of Section 4. Recall the graph given by Figure 2: X = fx; yg,  (x; y) = q and
 (y; x) = 0. There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the rms play a format
strategy that satises  (x) = 1 q
2 q , and a pricing strategy for which the supports of F
x
and F y are [ 1
3+q
; 1] and [ 1 q
3 q2 ;
1
3+q
]. Thus, the supports of the format-dependent price
strategies are nested in one another. Firms earn max-min payo¤s in this equilibrium.
6 Asymmetric Firm Assignment
Equilibrium analysis under order dependence is greatly simplied if the assumption
that the consumers initial rm assignment is symmetric is dropped. Suppose that
the consumer is initially assigned to rm 1, referred to as the Incumbent. Firm 2 is
referred to as the Entrant. In this case, rm 1s max-min payo¤ is 1   v, while rm
2s max-min payo¤ is zero.
Proposition 7 Any Nash equilibrium
 
i; (F
x
i )x2Supp(i)

i=1;2
of the Incumbent-Entrant
model has the following properties:
(i) (1; 2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game in which
rm 1 (2) is the hider (seeker).
(ii) Firm 1s equilibrium payo¤ is 1  v while rm 2s equilibrium payo¤ is v(1  v).
(iii) The rmsmarginal pricing strategies over [1  v; 1) are given by:
F1(p) = 1  1  v

p
F2(p) =
1
v
 [1  1  v

p
]
and F1 has an atom of size 1  v at p = 1.
The simplicity of the equilibrium characterization in this case results from the
rmsunambiguous incentives when choosing their format strategies. The Incumbent
has an unequivocal incentive to avoid a price comparison (because then it is chosen
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with probability one), while the Entrant has an unequivocal incentive to enforce a price
comparison (because otherwise it is chosen with probability zero).
7 Concluding Remarks: Framing and Product Dif-
ferentiation
This paper studies the implications of limited, format-sensitive comparability for mar-
ket competition. Throughout the paper, we adopted a complexity-based interpretation
of the comparability structure. A format was interpreted as a way of presenting prices,
and the function  measured the ease of comparisonbetween price formats.
However, building on Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), we can o¤er a broader interpreta-
tion of the graph (X; ) and interpret a format as any utility-irrelevant aspect of the
products presentation which a¤ects the propensity to make a preference comparison.
In particular, a format can represent an advertising message, a package design or a
positioning strategy. According to this interpretation, a link from x to y can mean
that the format x reminds the consumer of the format y, or creates mental associations
that eventually lead him to pay attention to any product framed by y. From this point
of view, our framework is applicable to many aspects of marketing and framing.
However, adopting this broader interpretation of formats makes the assumption
that formats are utility-irrelevant less obvious. For example, while the package of a
new product may a¤ect the probability that consumers notice it and thus consider it as
a potential substitute for their default product, consumers may also derive direct utility
from certain aspects of the package design. We are thus led to a comparison between
our limited-comparability approach and conventional models of product di¤erentiation
(e.g., see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992)). The rmsmixing over formats
in Nash equilibrium of our model can be viewed as a type of product di¤erentiation.
Since in our model the rmsproduct is inherently homogenous, such di¤erentiation
in formats is a pure reection of the rmsattempt to avoid price comparisons. By
comparison, in conventional models product di¤erentiation is viewed as the markets
response to consumersdi¤erentiated tastes.
To understand the relationship between the two approaches, it may be useful to
think of our model in spatial terms. Suppose that rms are stores and graph nodes
represent possible physical locations of stores. A link from one location x to another
location y indicates that it is costless to travel from x to y. The absence of a link
from x to y means that it is impossible to travel in that direction. According to this
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interpretation, the consumer follows a myopic search process in which he rst goes
randomly to one of the two stores (independently of their locations). Then, he travels
to the second store if and only if the trip is costless. Finally, the consumer chooses the
cheaper rm that his search process has elicited (with a tie-breaking rule that favors
the initial rm).
This re-interpretation is not given here for its realism, but because it is reminiscent
of conventional models of spatial competition. However, there is a crucial di¤erence. In
conventional models of spatial competition, consumers are attached to specic locations
and choose between stores according to their price and the cost of travelling to their
location. In particular, a consumer who is attached to a location x does not care at
all about the cost of transportation between two stores if none are located at x. In
contrast, consumer choice in our model is always sensitive to the probability of a link
between the rms locations. Recall that in our model consumer choice is typically
impossible to rationalize with a random utility function over pairs (p; x). In contrast,
conventional models of spatial competition (and product di¤erentiation in general) are
by construction consistent with a random utility function over price-location pairs.
Our model and the more conventional spatial-competition analogue are also dif-
ferent at the level of equilibrium predictions. Consider the star graph with q = 0.
The conventional model admits asymmetric equilibria in which rms adopt di¤erent
nodes and charge p = 1. In contrast, recall that our model rules out pure-strategy
equilibria that sustain non-competitive outcomes. In addition, it can be shown that
the anomalous comparative statics of equilibrium prots with respect to link strength
in bi-symmetric graphs cannot be reproduced in the conventional spatial-competition
analogue of our model.
The two perspectives have very di¤erent welfare implications. Consider again the
star graph. As the number of peripheral formats m increases, equilibrium prots
rise. Thus, increasing the number of formats has an unambiguously negative e¤ect
on consumer welfare. In contrast, in a standard di¤erentiated-taste model, increasing
the number of available brands has an ambiguous e¤ect. On one hand, it weakens
competitive forces and thus raises prices (as in our model). On the hand other, it
increases the number of available alternatives and thus raises the maximal utility that
each consumer can obtain. This latter feature is absent from the limited-comparability
perspective.
The two contrasting approaches to product di¤erentiation can be conveniently in-
tegrated. Suppose that a consumer type  is characterized by two primitives: a graph
 and a willingness-to-pay function u : X ! f0; 1g. The function u essentially
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describes the set of product formats (or brands) that type  likes, whereas the graph
 determines the types ability to make price comparisons. Exploring this model, and
particularly its ability to account for real-life consumer behavior data, is an interesting
challenge for future work.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
8.1 Proposition 1
Consider a Nash equilibrium in which rms earn strictly positive payo¤s. For each rm
i = 1; 2, let pli denote the inmum of the support of Fi. Clearly, p
l
1 = p
l
2. For instance,
if pl1 < p
l
2, rm 1 makes higher prots by increasing p
l
1 at some node. Hence, let p
l
denote the inmum of the support of F1 and F2. Since prots are positive, pl > 0.
Suppose that there is an interval (p; p0), pl < p < p0  1, such that F2(p) = F 2 (p0).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that F2(p00) < F2(p) for p00 < p. It follows
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that F1(p) = F 1 (p
0) since the prots of rm 1 from any strategy (p00; x), p00 2 (p; p0), in
the support of its equilibrium strategy are strictly lower than the prots from (p00+"; x),
where " > 0 is su¢ ciently small. We now show that there exists no x 2 X such that
(p; x) is a best-reply for either rm. If neither F1 nor F2 have a mass point at p, then
rm i can protably deviate from any (p   "; x), where " > 0 is su¢ ciently small, to
(p00; x), p00 2 (p; p0). Suppose then that F x2 has a mass point at p for some x 2 X. Such
a mass point is a best-reply for rm 2 only if rm 1 also has a mass point at (p; y) for
some y for which  (x; y) > 0 - otherwise, deviating to (p + "; x) would be protable
for rm 2, for a su¢ ciently small " > 0. But then rm 1 can protably deviate from
(p; y) to (p  "; y) for a su¢ ciently small " > 0. This concludes the proof.
8.2 Proposition 2
Dene XA = fx 2 X :  (y; x) = 1 for all y 2 Xg. Suppose that F1 (0) = 1. Then,
rm 1 makes zero prots. It follows that F2 (0) = 1 and hence rm 2 also makes zero
prots. Obviously, Supp (i)  XA, i = 1; 2, as if i (x) > 0 and  (y; x) < 1 for some
y, rm j can make positive prots charging p = 1 and choosing y. Hence, XA is not
empty.
Suppose now that XA is not empty. If F1 (0) < 1, then rm 2 makes positive
prots. Thus, F2 (0) < 1 and rm 1 also makes positive prots. We rst show that it is
impossible that  (x; y) = 1 for all x 2 Supp (2), y 2 Supp (1). Assume the contrary.
By Proposition 1, the upper bound of the support of Fi is equal to 1 for i = 1; 2. Take
a node z in the support of 2 such that the upper bound of the support of F zi is equal
to one. The prots of rm 2 are equal to
1
2
X
x2X
 
1  F x 1 (1)

1 (x)
Choosing a price equal to 1  " and a node x in XA, rm 2 obtains
(1  ")
2
X
x2X
(1   (x; x)F x1 (1  ") + (1  F x1 (1  ")))1 (x)
Since rm 2s payo¤ is positive, F x 1 (1) < 1 for some x 2 Supp (F1). But then,
for " su¢ ciently small, the second expression is larger than the rst expression, a
contradiction.
Now let p be the lowest price p in Supp (F1) [ Supp (F2) for which there exist
x 2 Supp (j) and y 2 Supp (i), where i 6= j, such that p 2 Supp (F yi ) and  (x; y) < 1.
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Obviously, p > pl. Without loss of generality, suppose that p 2 Supp (F y2 ). Firm 2s
payo¤ from the pure strategy (p; y) is
p
2
X
x2X
 
1   (y; x)F x 1 (p) +  (x; y) (1  F x1 (p))

1 (x)
If rm 2 deviates to the pure strategy (p   "; x), x 2 XA, it will earn
p   "
2
X
x2X
(1   (x; x)F x1 (p   ") + (1  F x1 (p   ")))1 (x)
By the denition of p, if F x 1 (p
) > 0, then  (y; x) = 1. Since  (x; y) < 1 for some
x 2 Supp (1), for " su¢ ciently small, the second expression is larger than the rst
expression, a contradiction.
8.3 Proposition 4
The proof is based on the following version of Farkaslemma. Let 
 be an lm matrix
and b an l-dimensional vector. Then, exactly one of the following two statements is
true: (i) there exists  2 Rm such that 
 = b and   0; (ii) there exists  2 Rl such
that 
T   0 and bT  < 0.
Suppose that (X; ) is not weighted-regular. Let us rst show that for every  2
(X) such that  (x) > 0 for all x 2 X, there exists ~ 2 (X) such that, for all y 2 X,X
x2X
 (x) (x; y) <
X
x2X
~ (x) (x; y)
Order the nodes so that X = f1; ::; ng. Any  2 (X) is thus represented by a row
vector (1; :::; n). Let  be a n  n matrix whose ijth entry is  (i; j). Note that
 = T . Since (X; ) is not weighted-regular, there exist no  2 Rn and c > 0 such
that T = (c; c; :::; c)T . By FarkasLemma, there exists a column vector  2 Rn
such that   0 and (c; c; :::; c) < 0. Since (i; i) = 1 for every i 2 f1; :::; ng and
(i; j)  0 for all i; j 2 f1; :::; ng, we can modify  into a column vector ~ such that
~i > i for every i, ~ > 0 and
P
i
~i = 0. Let  2 (X) and (i) > 0 for every
i 2 f1; :::; ng. By the construction of ~, ~ =  + ~ is also a probability distribution
over X, for a su¢ ciently small  > 0. Then
~T = T + ~ > T
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In particular, every component of the vector ~T is strictly larger than the correspond-
ing component of T .
By hypothesis, 2(x) > 0 for all x 2 X. We have shown that there exists another
format strategy ~ such that every format y 2 X induces a strictly higher probability
of a price comparison than 2. This contradicts that 2 is a max-min strategy.
8.4 Proposition 5
Consider a bi-symmetric graph (X; ). Dene
a = 1 + qY (nY   1)  qnY
b = 1 + qZ (nZ   1)  qnZ
One can verify that weighted regularity holds if and only if the system"
a  b
nY nZ
#"
1
2
#
=
"
0
1
#
has a non-negative solution - that is, if and only if ab  0 (or, equivalently, if and only
if (qY   q)(qZ   q)  0).
Let
 
; (F x)x2Supp()

be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, and let F denote
the equilibrium marginal pricing strategy. Let Sx denote the support of F x, and let pxl
and pxu denote the inmum and supremum of Sx. Let vx() be the probability that
the consumer makes a price comparison conditional on the event that one rm adopts
the format x, that is,
vx () =
X
y2X
 (y) (x; y) (5)
Note that for every x; x0 2 Y (similarly, for every x; x0 2 Z), vx () = vx0 () if and
only if (x) = (x0).
The following claims establish Proposition 5.
Lemma 3 F (p) is continuous on [pl; 1].
Proof. It follows from standard arguments, due to the symmetry of equilibrium.
Lemma 4  (x) =  (x0) for any x; x0 2 Y or x; x0 2 Z, i = 1; 2.
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Proof. Suppose that  (x) >  (y) for some x; y 2 Y . Firm is payo¤ from the pure
strategy (pxu; x) is
pxu
0@ qY  (y) (1  F y (pxu))+P
x2Y (x;y) (1  F x (pxu)) qY  (x) +
P
x2Z (1  F x (pxu)) q (x) +
1
2
(1  vx ())
1A ,
If the rm deviates to the strategy (pxu; y), it earns
pxu
0@  (y) (1  F y (pxu))P
x2Y (x;y) (1  F x (pxu)) qY  (x) +
P
x2Z (1  F x (pxu)) q (x) +
1
2
(1  vy ())
1A .
Since  (x) >  (y), v () > vy (), hence the deviation is protable. An analogous
argument for Z establishes the claim.
Lemma 5 For any p 2 [pl; 1], F x (p) = F x0 (p) whenever x; x0 2 Y or x; x0 2 Z.
Proof. Suppose that F y (p) > F y0 (p) for y; y0 2 Y . Firm is payo¤ from the pure
strategy (p; y) is
p
0@ (1  F y (p)) (y) + qY  1  F y0 (p) (y)+P
x2Y (y;y0) (1  F x (p)) qY  (x) +
P
x2Z (1  F x (p)) q (x) +
1
2
(1  vy ())
1A
If the rm deviates to the pure strategy (p; y0), it earns
p
0@  1  F y0 (p) (y) + qY (1  F y (p)) (y)+P
x2Y (y;y0) (1  F x (p)) qY  (x) +
P
x2Z (1  F x (p)) q (x) +
1
2
 
1  vy0 ()
1A .
By Lemma 4, (y) = (y0) and therefore vy () = vy
0
(). It follows that the deviation
is protable.
Lemma 6 If  (x) = 0 for some x 2 X, then  veries weighted regularity.
Proof. Suppose that (x) = 0 for some x 2 Y . By Lemma 4,  is a uniform
distribution over Z - thus, in particular, (y) = 0 for all y 2 Y . Therefore, vz () = qZ
for every z 2 Z and vy () = q for every y 2 Y . If qZ 6= q, it must be protable to
deviate either to the pure strategy (1; y) or to the pure strategy (pl; y). If qZ = q, then
 veries weighted regularity.
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Lemma 7 Suppose that  (x) > 0 for all x 2 X. Then:
(i) If (X; ) is not weighted-regular, either pyu = pzl or pzu = pyl for any y 2 Y and
z 2 Z.
(ii) If pyu = pzl or pzu = pyl for any y 2 Y and z 2 Z, (X; ) is not weighted-regular.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (X; ) is not weighted-regular and vz () < vy (). By Lemma
5, the nodes in Y have the same F y and the nodes in Z have the same F z. Therefore,
Sy \ Sz 6= ?, for any y 2 Y and z 2 Z. The following equations must hold in equilib-
rium.
 (z) qnZ (1  F z (pyu)) + 1
2
(1  vy ()) =
 (z) (1 + qZ (nZ   1)) (1  F z (pyu)) + 1
2
(1  vz ())
 (z) qnZ + (1 + qY (nY   1)) (y)
  
1  F y  pzl+ 1
2
(1  vy ()) =
 (z) (1 + qZ (nZ   1)) + qnY  (y)
  
1  F y  pzl+ 1
2
(1  vz ())
which simplify to
b (z) (1  F z (pyu)) = b (z)  a (y)  1  F y  pzl = vz ()  vy ()
2
Hence, b < 0. Since the graph is not weighted regular, a > 0. It can be easily veried
that the above equations hold only if F z (pyu) = 0 and F y
 
pzl

= 1. If vz () > vy (),
a symmetric argument establishes the claim.
(ii) Suppose that pyu = pzl. Note that
vz ()  vy () = b (z)  a (y)
In equilibrium
b (z) =
b (z)  a (y)
2
Since  (y) ;  (z) > 0, we have ab < 0. A symmetric argument establishes the claim
for the case pzu = pyl.
Lemma 8 Suppose that  (x) > 0 for any x 2 X. If pyu 6= pzl and pzu 6= pyl for any
y 2 Y and z 2 Z, then  veries weighted regularity, max-min payo¤s are obtained,
and F z (p) = F y (p) for any p 2 [pl; 1].
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Proof. Lemma 7 implies that if pyu 6= pzl and pzu 6= pyl for any y 2 Y and z 2 Z then
the graph is weighted-regular. As in the proof of Lemma 7, the following equilibrium
conditions must hold
b (z) (1  F z (pyu)) = b (z)  a (y)
2
b (z)  a (y)  1  F y  pzl = b (z)  a (y)
2
First note that if either b = 0 or a = 0, then either  (y) = 0 or  (z) = 0. Hence,
suppose that ab > 0. Setting (1  F z (pyu)) =  and  1  F y  pzl = , rewrite the
system in matrix notation as264 b   b2 a2b
2
 a + a
2
375"  (z)
 (y)
#
=
"
0
0
#
This system has a non-null solution if and only if
     + 2 + 1 = 0
which is only possible, for 0  ;   1, when  = 1;  = 0 or  = 0;  = 1. In the
former case, vzi () = v
y
i () and thus  veries weighted regularity. In the latter case,
b (z) =
b (z)  a (y)
2
and hence positive solutions for  (z) ;  (y) do not exist when ab > 0. Thus in equilib-
rium, F z (pyu) = 1, F y
 
pzl

= 0, and vz () = vy (). Consequently, for any p 2 [pl; 1]
b (z) (1  F z (p)) = a (y) (1  F y (p))
Since vz ()  vy () = b (z)  a (y) = 0, we have F z (p) = F y (p).
Part (i) of the proposition follows from Lemmas 6, 7, and 8. If qY < q < q

Z , then a
symmetric Nash equilibrium must be a cuto¤ equilibrium by Lemmas 6 and 7. More-
over, by Lemma 5, it su¢ ces to consider two cases: either U is a uniform distribution
over Y and L is a uniform distribution over Z, or U is a uniform distribution over Z
and L is a uniform distribution over Y . To pin down the format strategy , we use
the equilibrium condition that rms are indi¤erent between playing y 2 Y and z 2 Z
at the cuto¤ price pm (pm = pzu = pyl in the former case, and pm = pzl = pyu in the
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latter case).
In the former case, the condition is given by the equation
 (y)nY q    (z)nZqZ =  (y)nY qY    (z)nZq
for arbitrary y 2 Y and z 2 Z. In the latter case, the condition is given by the equation
 (z)nZq    (y)nY qY =  (z)nZqZ    (y)nY q
for arbitrary y 2 Y and z 2 Z. Since qY < q < qZ , the latter case is ruled out, and the
former equation yields .
8.5 Proposition 7
(i) Whenever p1  p2, the consumer chooses rm 1 with probability one. Whenever
p1 > p2, the consumer chooses rm 2 if and only if he makes a price comparison.
Therefore, for every price p that lies strictly above the inmum of Supp(F2), rm 1s
optimal format minimizes v(; L2 (p)), where L2 (p) denotes rm 2s format strategy
conditional on p0 < p. Similarly, for every price p that lies strictly below the supremum
of Supp(F1), rm 2s optimal format maximizes v(
U
1 (p); ), where U1 (p) denotes rm
1s format strategy conditional on p0 > p. It can be veried that Proposition 1 extends
to the Incumbent-Entrant model. Therefore, Supp(F1) and Supp(F2) have the same
inmum pl < 1 and the same supremum pu = 1. Therefore, in Nash equilibrium,
rm 1s format strategy conditional on p > pl and rm 2s format strategy conditional
on p < 1 constitute a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game. These
format strategies are equal to the rmsmarginal equilibrium format strategies, because
as we will verify below, F1 does not have an atom on pl and F2 does not have an atom
on p = 1.
(ii) Since p = 1 is in the support of F1 and rm 2s format strategy conditional on
p < 1 max-minimizes v, rm 1s equilibrium payo¤ is 1   v. Since rm 1 is chosen
with probability one when it charges pl, it follows that pl = 1  v. But since rm 1s
format strategy conditional on p > pl min-maximizes v, it follows that rm 2s payo¤
is v  (1  v).
(iii) The formulas of F1 and F2 follow directly from the condition that every
p 2 (1   v; 1) maximizes each rms prot given the opponents strategy, and the
characterization of rm 1s format strategy conditional on p > pl and rm 2s format
strategy conditional on p < 1.
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